We determine the secrecy capacities of AVQCs (arbitrarily varying quantum channels). Both secrecy capacity with average error probability and with maximal error probability are derived. Both derivations are based on one common code construction. The code we construct fulfills a stringent secrecy requirement, which is called the strong code concept. We determine when the secrecy capacity is a continuous function of the system parameters and completely characterize its discontinuity points both for average error criterion and for maximal error criterion. Furthermore, we prove the phenomenon "super-activation" for secrecy capacities of AVQCs, i.e., two quantum channels both with zero secrecy capacity, which, if used together, allow secure transmission with positive capacity. We also discuss the relations between the entanglement distillation capacity, the entanglement generating capacity, and the strong subspace transmission capacity for AVQCs.
I. INTRODUCTION
The noise of a quantum channel can be interpreted as interaction with the environment. Following the general protocol of [18] , we assume that this environment is completely under the control of the eavesdropper. A channel with an eavesdropper called a wiretap channel and was first introduced in [21] . The secrecy capacity for classical-quantum wiretap channel has been determined in [18] and [16] , where classicalquantum channels are quantum channels whose sender's inputs are classical variables. The arbitrarily varying channel was first introduced in [7] . In this model we consider channel uncertainty, i.e. transmission over a channel which is not stationary, but can change with every use of the channel. It is interpreted as a channel with a jammer. Arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel has been considered in [3] , where a lower bound for the capacity has been given. [6] improved this result by delivering an alternative proof and a proof of the strong converse. Furthermore [2] established the Ahlswede Dichotomy, i.e., either the deterministic capacity of an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel is zero, * Project "Informationstheorie des Quanten-Repeaters, Teilprojekt Mehrwegkommunikationsprotokolle für Quanten or it equals its randomness assisted capacity, and delivered a sufficient and necessary condition for the zero deterministic capacity. In [13] a simplification of this condition is given. This work is a furtherance of our previous papers [9] , [10] , and [11] , where we considered channel robustness against jamming, and concurrently security against eavesdropping for classicalquantum channels. In this work we determine the secrecy capacities of arbitrarily varying quantum channels (AVQCs). The capacities of classical arbitrarily varying channel under maximal error criterion and under the average error criterion are, in general, not equal. The capacity formula of classical arbitrarily varying channels under maximal error criterion is still an open problem (cf. [1] and [6] ). Interestingly, [13] shows that the capacities of an AVQC under maximal error criterion and under the average error criterion are equal. In this work we extend this observation: We show that the secrecy capacities of AVQC under maximal error criterion and under the average error criterion are equal. As an application of our results, we turn to the question: Is the secrecy capacity a continuous function of the system parameters? We show that the continuity of the secrecy capacity of an AVQC under randomness assisted quantum coding only depends on the legal channel. Moreover we improve the result of [15] when we give a generalized control function. This control function only depends on the legal channel. The authors of [2] made the conjecture that the entanglement generating capacity of an AVQC is equal to its entanglement generating capacity under shared randomness assisted quantum coding. We demonstrate that the conditions under which the secrecy capacity is a continuous function of system parameters, while the validity of conjecture of [2] implies that the entanglement generating capacity, the entanglement distillation capacity, and the strong subspace transmission capacity of an AVQC are continuous functions of the system parameters. Furthermore, we show as a consequence of our results that there is a phenomenon called "super-activation" for the secrecy capacity of AVQCs.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We denote the set of distributions on a finite set A by P (A) and the space of density operators on a finite-dimensional complex Hilbert space H by S(H). For finite-dimensional complex Hilbert spaces H and H a quantum channel N : S(H) → S(H ), S(H) ρ → N (ρ) ∈ S(H ) is represented by a completely positive trace-preserving map which accepts input quantum states in S(H) and produces output quantum states in S(H ). We denote for discrete random variables X and Y their mutual information by and for a quantum state ρ ∈ S(H) its von Neumann entropy of ρ by S(ρ) = −tr(ρ log ρ). Let Φ := {ρ x : x ∈ A} be a set of quantum states labeled by elements of A. For a probability distribution Q on A, the Holevo quantity χ is defined as The following Definition II.2 plays a very important role for the characterization of the capacity of AVQCs. The intuitive meaning of this is that the jammer can choose the state of the channel such that any two send sequences of quantum states of any length, may be confused by the receiver.
there exists a map τ which maps from {ρ L , ρ L } to the set of distributions on Θ L such that
Following [18] we now define the secret message transmission protocol when we assume that the environment is completely under the control of the eavesdropper.
Definition II.3. Let A and B be quantum systems and Θ be a finite set. Let I = {N θ : θ ∈ Θ} be an AVQC. Following [18] we assume that the environment Z is completely under the control of the eavesdropper in following sense:
If the channel state is θ, the local output density matrix seen by the receiver is tr Z x p(x)U N θ |φ x φ x | A U * N θ , and the local output density matrix seen by the environment (which we interpret as the wiretapper) is
For the transmission of classical information via a quantum channel, we at first have to convert a classical message into a quantum state. When the states to be produced in the input system are given by the set
Here for a distribution P on A we denote F (P ) := x∈A P (x)F (x). In view of this, we have the following definition.
, specified by a matrix of conditional probabilities E(·|·), and a collection of positive-semidefinite operators {D j : j ∈ {1, · · · , J n }} on H ⊗n , which is a partition of the identity, i.e. Jn j=1 D j = id H ⊗n . We call these operators the decoder operators.
The average probability of the decoding error of a deterministic code C, is defined as
The maximal probability of the decoding error of a deterministic code C, is defined as
For classical arbitrarily varying channels, capacities under the average error criterion and under maximal error criterion distinguish from each other. The capacity formula for the latter one is still unknown (cf. [1] ). This statement is not true for the capacities of arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel.
Definition II.5. Let I = {N θ : θ ∈ Θ} be an AVQC. A nonnegative number R is an achievable secrecy rate for I under the average error criterion if for every > 0, δ > 0, ζ > 0 and sufficiently large n there exists a finite set A, a map F : A → S(H A ), and an (n, J n ) code C = E, {D n j : j = 1, · · · J n } such that log Jn n > R − δ, and
Here R uni is a random variable uniformly distributed on {1, . . . , J n } and It is understood that the sender and the receiver have to select their coding scheme first. Our Definition 1 and Definition 2 require that a private information transmission can be guaranteed under the assumption that this coding scheme is known by the jammer and the eavesdropper.
Definition II.6. Let I = {N θ : θ ∈ Θ} be an AVQC. We denote the set of (n, J n ) deterministic codes for I by Λ. A non-negative number R is an achievable secrecy rate for I under randomness assisted coding if for every δ > 0, ζ > 0, and > 0, if n is sufficiently large, there is a finite set A, a map F : A → S(H A ), and a distribution G on (Λ, σ) such that log Jn n > R − δ, and
Here σ is a sigma-algebra, so chosen such that the functions γ → P e (C γ , θ n ) and γ → χ (R uni ; Z C γ ,θ n ) are both Gmeasurable with respect to σ for every θ n ∈ Θ n . The supremum on achievable secrecy rates for I under randomness assisted coding is called the randomness assisted secrecy capacity of I, denoted by C s (I, r).
The randomness assisted code technique is not to be confused with the random encoding technique. For the random encoding technique, the sender randomly chooses a code word to encode a message j according to a probability distribution. The receiver should be able to decode j even when he only knows the probability distribution, but not the actually chosen code word. For the randomness assisted code technique, the receiver can decode the message if and only if he knows the outputs of the distribution.
Definition II.7. Let I = {N θ : θ ∈ Θ} be an AVQC. A nonnegative number R is an achievable secrecy rate for I under the maximal error criterion if for every > 0, δ > 0, ζ > 0 and sufficiently large n there exists a finite set A, a map F : A → S(H A ), and an (n, J n ) code C = E, {D n j : j = 1, · · · J n } such that log Jn n > R − δ, and
The supremum on achievable (deterministic) secrecy rates of I under the maximal error criterion is called the secrecy capacity of I under the maximal error criterion, denoted by C s,max (I).
The maximal error criterion is the strongest error criterion in the sense that we assume that the jammer not only know the coding scheme, but also the actual message. Definition II.7 requires that a private information transmission can be guaranteed even under the assumption that the jammer will choose the most advantaged jamming attacking strategy depending on his knowledge. In [9] we established the Ahlswede Dichotomy for arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels, i.e., either the deterministic capacity of an arbitrarily varying channel is zero, or, it equals its randomness assisted capacity. Our code concept was a two-part code word. In the first part, a public codeword was transmitted to synchronize sender and receiver for the second part of transmission. In the second part of transmission, a randomness assisted code was used where the messages of the first part served as common randomness. We call it the weak code concept when the first part which synchronizes the second part is public, and the strong code concept when the first part is also secure.
Definition II.8. Let A, B, and C be finite sets. Let Θ := {1, . . . , T } be a finite set. For every θ ∈ Θ, let W θ be a classical channel P (A) → P (B) and V θ be a classical channel P (A) → P (C). We call the set of the classical channel pairs {(W θ , V θ ) : θ ∈ Θ} a (classical) arbitrarily varying wiretap channel when the channel state θ varies from symbol to symbol in an arbitrary manner.
III. MAIN RESULTS
Our main results are included in the following theorems and corollaries:
Theorem III.1. Let I = {N θ : θ ∈ Θ} be an AVQC 1) If the I is not L-symmetrizable for some L ∈ N, then C s (I) under strong code concept is given by
The supremum is taken over all chosen finite sets A, χ(P, B n q ) − max θ n ∈Θ n χ(P, Z θ n )) .
2) If I is L-symmetrizable for all L ∈ N, then C s,max (I) = 0 under the strong code concept.
The secrecy capacity of an arbitrarily varying quantum channel I under randomness assisted quantum coding is continuous if the receiver's system can be described by a finite dimensional Hilbert space in the following sense: Corollary III.4. The deterministic secrecy capacity of an arbitrarily varying quantum channel is in general not continuous.
Corollary III.5. Super-activation occurs for secrecy capacities of AVQCs.
In [15] it has been shown that the secrecy capacity of a classical arbitrarily varying wiretap channel under randomness assisted coding is continuous in the sense of the following Lemma:
Lemma III.6. For a classical arbitrarily varying wiretap channel {(W θ , V θ ) : θ ∈ Θ}, where W θ : P (A) → P (B) and V θ : P (A) → P (C), and a positive δ let C δ be the set of all classical arbitrarily varying wiretap channels
When |A| is finite, then for any positive there is a positive δ such that for all
However, the proof for Lemma III.6 in [15] requires the outputs of the eavesdropper's channel to be include in a finite alphabet. Since in general, the legal channel users do not have control over the the eavesdropper's channel, this proof is still nonetheless capable of improvements. We will give an alternative proof for Lemma III.6 such that the continuity does not depend on the alphabet of the eavesdropper.
In [2] , [13] , and [14] , the so called "Ahlswede Dichotomy" for the entanglement distillation capacity, the entanglement generating capacity, and the strong subspace transmission capacity has been shown, i.e., each of these capacities is either zero or equal to the respective randomness assisted capacity. However the question when these capacities are zero while the respective capacities under shared randomness assisted quantum coding are positive is still an open problem. In [2] the authors strongly supposed that this case will never occur. This conjecture is still unsolved by now. If this conjecture is true, then these three capacities under deterministic coding are continuous functions of the channel system parameters. Our Corollary III.3 means if this conjecture is true then for an AVQC, the behavior of these three capacities under deterministic coding and the secure capacity under deterministic coding differ significantly. This is insofar particularly interesting since in [18] Devetak used the secure capacity for the characterization of the above mentioned three capacities for arbitrarily varying quantum channels (the achievements of the capacity formulas).
IV. PROOFS OF THE MAIN RESULTS
Here we give sketches of proofs for our main results. For the complete proof we suggest our readers to view our full version [12] .
We have used a trick for the result in [11] to define a set of classical-quantum channels with positive deterministic secure capacity in sense of the strong code concept. However, the construction of an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel by means of an arbitrarily varying quantum wiretap channel with positive deterministic secure capacity in sense of the strong code concept is even harder. We have to combine the technique in [11] , the technique of [14] and additionally, the concept of block coding for our proof, where we get a deterministic code word which is a composition of a ((log log n) 3 , (log n) 3 ) secret deterministic code word and a ((log n) 2 − (log log n) 3 , n 3 ) secret random code word.
Sketch of the Proof for Theorem III.1:
In [14] a technique has been introduced to construct an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel by means of an AVQC. However this technique does not provide security. We have to find a more sophisticated way. We assume that there is a L such that I is not L-symmetrizable and there is a finite set of letter A , a map F , and a distribution p such that
We denote the dimension of H A by d. Now choose arbitrarily d L 2 density operatorsM i , i = 1, · · · , d L 2 which span the space of Hermitian operators on H A L . We define a new set of letters A 1 := A ∪ {1, · · · , d 2 } and a map F by F (a) = F (a) if a ∈ A ; M a if a ∈ {1, · · · , d 2 } . We apply block coding and regarding L uses of the quantum channel as a single quantum channel. The arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel {N θ L • F L : θ L ∈ Θ L } is not symmetrizable. By [11] , (5) implies
Similar to our code in [11] we can now construct a secure (L(log n) 2 + n, J n + n 3 ) code with two-part code words for
The first parts of the code words arise from a ((log n) 2 , n 3 ) secure deterministic code. They are used to send the randomization index, i.e. the outputs of a uniformly distributed random variable on {1, · · · , n 3 }, to the legal receiver such that the eavesdropper knows nothing about the common randomness. The second parts are randomness assisted secure code words transmitting the actual secret message. By a technique introduced in [10] we show that the eavesdropper gathers nether the randomization nor the message from the second parts.
Sketch of the Proof for Theorem III.2:
One of the major difficulties we have to overcome is to show the positivity of the secure capacity under maximal error criterion when the deterministic capacity is not equal to zero.
First if m is sufficiently large we find quantum states σ 1 , σ 2 ∈ S(H m ) and positive-semidefinite operatorsḊ 1 , D 2 on H ⊗m such that for all θ m ∈ Θ m and i ∈ {1, 2} tr(N θ m (σ i )Ḋ i ) > 1 2 . Secondly we define a classical-quantum channelṄ θ m such that if m is sufficiently large by Theorem 1 of [10] we can find a (m , 2) code such thatṄ θ m has a positive randomness assisted secrecy capacity. Now we construct two sets of superposition codes for every θ mm ∈ Θ mm to build a classical channelN θ mm : P ({1, 2, 3, 4}) → P ({1, 2, 3, 4}) with positive deterministic capacity under the maximal error criterion. We show that this implies the positivity of the secure capacity of {N θ : θ ∈ Θ} under maximal error criterion. Similar to the proof of Theorem III.1, we can now construct a code with two-part code words
Sketch of the Proof for Corollary III.3:
By the triangle inequality we then have
with an arbitrarily small h(δ). Similarly we show that |χ(p; B q ) − χ(p;Ḃ q )| ≤ 8δ log(dim H B − 1) − 4 · h(δ).
Our proof of Corollary III.3 requests that the receiver's quantum system has a finite dimension, but noting from the eavesdropper's system. In [15] the continuity of the secrecy capacity of a classical arbitrarily varying channel under randomness assisted quantum coding has been shown. That proof is only valid when the alphabet that the eavesdropper uses is finite. Since for the classical case we cannot always expect that the eavesdropper is restrict to a finite alphabet, we may use another way to overcome the problem:
Sketch of an alternative proof for Lemma III.6:
We fix a θ ∈ Θ and a random variable X distributed on A We have |I(X, Z θ )−I(X, Z θ )| = |H(X|Z θ )−H(X|Z θ )| ≤ log |A| and similarly: |I(X, B θ ) − I(X, B θ )| ≤ log |X|.
This proof shows that in the classical case also, the continuity does not depend on some unknown strategy of the eavesdropper.
We show Corollary III.4 and Corollary III.5 by giving examples in our full version [12] . Furthermore in the full version [12] we completely characterize the discontinuity points of arbitrarily varying quantum channels deterministic secrecy capacities and give an example when the deterministic secrecy capacity of an arbitrarily varying quantum channel is not equal to its randomness assisted secrecy capacity. If the previously mentioned conjecture in [2] is true, then it is not possible to find any respective examples for the entanglement distillation capacity, the entanglement generating capacity, and the strong subspace transmission capacity. This shows that the Ahlswede Dichotomy is indeed a "dichotomy", and having access to a resource is very valuable for the robust and secure message transmission. In [12] we also determined the secrecy capacity of the compound quantum channel for both case with and without channel state information at the encoder.
